

# The Professional Soldier and the Warrior Spirit

Lt Col Donald R. Baucom

*The balance among the three archetypes of the professional soldier in the United States—the heroic leader, the manager- and the technologist—has shifted relentlessly to the latter two. The shift has been prodded with the advent of the all-volunteer force. It is the consequence as well of a progressive civilianization of the US defense establishment—manifest both in the replacement of military men with civilians and the displacement of military men from their traditional roles. Finally, it reflects an enthrallment with technology that seems to be aiming at the complete mechanization of warfare. If we are to have the military establishment needed to fend against an ever more dangerous global environment, we must urgently rediscover the focus of the military professional and find ways to restore the warrior-leader to the position of honor traditionally accorded him.*

According to Morris Janowitz, the officer corps is composed of heroic leaders, military managers, and military technologists. The heroic leader represents the warrior tradition of military service; he is the embodiment of the “martial spirit and the theme of personal valor.” While the heroic leader generally sees military service as a way of life, this is not the case with the military manager, who tends to be concerned mainly with the practical, concrete aspects of warfare, such as how to mobilize a nation’s resources for war. The military technologist’s outlook is very similar to that of the military manager. Indeed, he is neither a practicing scientist nor a practicing engineer, but rather “a military manager, with a fund of technical knowledge and a quality for dramatizing the need for technological progress.” Examples of each type of officer in the US tradition are Curtis LeMay, the heroic leader; George Marshall, the military manager; and Hyman Rickover, the military technologist.<sup>1</sup>

## A Shifting Balance in the Military

The story of the American military profession during the first half of this century has been one of struggle between the military managers and the heroic leaders for control of the military establishment.<sup>2</sup> But in the nuclear age, the rising importance of technology and the changing role of the military transmute the military establishment into a “constabulary force,” in which the struggle between manager and leader tends to be resolved by a fusion of the two types into a single, hybrid role model.<sup>3</sup>

Lt Col Donald R. Baucom is currently serving as a historian in the US Air Force Office of History. He is a 1962 graduate of the US Air Force Academy (USAFA) and holds a PhD in the history of science from the University of Oklahoma. He has operational experience in the communications-electronics career field and has taught military history at the USAFA, having also served on the Air War College faculty and as director of research for the Airpower Research Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base. His last assignment was as editor of the *Air University Review*.

To be successful, Janowitz maintained, this modern military establishment must be controlled by military managers, but its top leadership must include a “leaven of heroic leaders” whose primary responsibility is to keep alive the fighter spirit that must permeate military organizations. This warrior spirit, in the words of Janowitz, “is not easily defined; it is based on a psychological motive, which drives a man to seek success in combat, regardless of his personal safety.”<sup>4</sup>

The dominant military managers share responsibility with the heroic leaders for sustaining the fighting spirit. The military managers, Janowitz wrote, must ensure that the military profession projects a martial image and must help the heroic leaders instill the warrior spirit in the next generation of young officers. As the most influential members of the military profession, the military manager also must see to it that the proper balance is maintained among military managers, military technologists, and heroic leaders, for an effective military establishment requires the dedicated services of all three types of officers.<sup>5</sup>

Janowitz, obviously, is dealing here with clear, black-and-white distinctions that are rarely found in the real world. Yet, his analysis has value, for before we can reasonably discuss the shades of gray that comprise the middle ground, we must define the ends of the spectrum with which we are dealing. Once defined, the extremes become vantage points from which to evaluate current trends affecting the American military profession.

Viewing the US military profession today from the perspectives offered by the Janowitzan model of the officer corps, we can conclude that it seems to be losing the essential balance among the three types of officers that must be maintained under the overall guidance of the dominant military manager. The balance is being disrupted by several factors that are eroding the respect traditionally accorded the heroic leader within the military profession; with his decline comes a deterioration of the warrior spirit he embodies. These factors are the all-volunteer force, a civilianization of American military institutions and activities, an overemphasis on management, and an enthrallment by technology.

## **The Impact of the All-Volunteer Force**

In keeping with the tradition of American civil-military relations, the all-volunteer force (AVF) isolates Americans from the standing military establishment they have distrusted since seventeenth-century English immigrants to the colonies brought with them a fear of Oliver Cromwell's New Model Army. Under the AVF concept, no one is forced to serve in the military: marketplace incentives are used to attract enough volunteers to sustain the military at the prescribed strength. While the AVF has isolated American society from the military, it has exposed many of the military's essential institutions to the eroding influences of our commerce-oriented, individualistic society.

To draw sufficient numbers of recruits to the AVF, the military adopted an advertising campaign that portrays the military as an attractive way of life. Advertisements that scarcely hint of the hardships of military life stress good times, adventure, travel, job training, job experience, pay, and fringe benefits. As one TV commentator noted during an evening network news program: "The Army does what everyone who has something to sell does. It advertises, and it's difficult to tell whether it's maneuver time or Miller time."<sup>6</sup>

The AVF recruiting campaign leads young people entering the military to expect conditions that correspond to civilian life. Recruits consider themselves party to a contract binding the military to give them the jobs, the training and the civilian-like lifestyle they believe they were promised by recruiters and advertisements.<sup>7</sup> All too often, military life does not live up to their expectations. Two things result: a high percentage of enlistees do not complete their first enlistment, and military establishments are forced to change in an effort to meet recruit expectations.

In their effort to keep recruits content, the armed forces have civilianized much of military life. The Army abandoned the early morning rite of reveille and began selling beer in mess halls and living quarters. Soldiers and airmen who still live on military bases seldom reside in open-bay barracks, and frequently in motel-like quarters with two or three people per room. A substantial portion of the new enlisted force is married and resides off base. These latter changes tend to undermine the camaraderie that is an important bonding element among combat-ready soldiers.<sup>8</sup>

In addition to undermining the concept of military service as a way of life focused on preparation for war, the AVF brings with it social problems that drain the energies of officers. Associated with the increased reliance on women under the AVF concept is the necessity for officers to deal with such matters as sexual harassment, pregnancy, joint spouse assignments, and women assigned to jobs for which they may have insufficient physical attributes. Furthermore, there are the inescapable social problems associated with male recruits who come all too often from the lower socioeconomic strata of American society and tend to be poorly educated, have low mental qualifications, and are at times alienated from the society they are expected to defend.

Having been forced to recruit like a business and therefore attracting people motivated by marketplace incentives, the military naturally drifts toward the management practices used by private industry. For example, flex time, job enrichment, participatory decision-making processes, and coworker standards are some of the management concepts that enjoy at least some degree of support or use within the US Air Force.<sup>9</sup>

Hints that these problems and practices are detracting from the effective functioning of military organizations can be found here and there in our professional literature.<sup>10</sup> In a "can do" organization, such as the military that stresses getting the job done regardless of obstacles, hints are likely to be the proverbial tip of the iceberg. How serious must a situation be for a commander of a ship to declare his vessel unfit for sea duty?

In the all-volunteer force environment, then, officers must devote more time and effort to coping with the AVF, and less time to the study of their profession and to the preparation of their units for war.<sup>11</sup>

An officer who views his tasks primarily in terms of management and the motivation of industrial workers is not likely to be as frustrated by an atmosphere in which self-satisfaction as opposed to service is stressed, for modern management theory focuses on people who are motivated primarily by personal gain. But what of the heroic leader? Will he not feel alienated, perhaps betrayed, in an environment where service, sacrifice, and a sense of duty are no longer emphasized? Will he not see efforts to cope with the AVF, and the AVF itself, as obstacles that hinder his efforts to make his unit combat ready?<sup>12</sup>

## **Civilianization of the Defense Establishment**

Having discussed the trend toward civilianization of the military way of life under the influence of the AVF, we now turn to a second form of civilianization in which civilians replace or displace military personnel.

Today, the US Defense Department employs about one civilian for every two military personnel in the regular armed forces.<sup>13</sup> This widespread use of civilians turns the Department of Defense (DOD) into an organization that attempts to achieve its purposes using two distinct groups of people with widely divergent value systems.

Generally, DOD civilians are governed by marketplace considerations. They are paid by the hour and must be paid overtime for work beyond the eight-hour day or forty-hour week. Many civilians are unionized, which means that at least some of their work conditions are defined in union contracts monitored by union stewards. On the other hand, military personnel are supposed to be governed by the military ethic, which places service to their organization above personal gain. There are no limits on the duty hours of service members, and they are paid a flat salary, regardless of the hours they work. There are no military unions.

Unusual situations develop when these two groups are cast together in the same organization. At times a civilian and a uniformed service member will be working side-by-

side, doing the same task but receiving different pay. Overtime tasks frequently must fall to the military member, since funding ceilings often preclude paying the extra money for civilian overtime. There is also the interesting situation in which civilians, who have more relaxed standards for dress and appearance, are responsible for enforcing military standards on uniformed personnel who work for them.

Under conditions such as these, it is difficult to preserve a concept of military service as a way of life based on a sense of duty and a spirit of personal sacrifice for the good of the mission. Military personnel are in constant contact with civilians who work “eight-to-five” days with no disruption to their weekends. What do military men feel when they have to work on weekends? What thoughts pass through the minds of voting soldiers and airmen who are subject to relatively strict military discipline when they note that civilians can have a union steward present when they are “counseled” for substandard performance? Do enlisted men accept the idea that compensatory time is a fair exchange for overtime work that civilian coworkers do not have to perform? How does one who considers himself a combat leader feel in an organization that is one-third civilian? How does he keep such a situation from eroding the military ethic that is central to his concept of military service?

While some civilians are physically taking the place of military men, others have been displacing military men in strategy-making and in the defense decision-making process.

### **Invasion of Academics and Systems Analysis**

This civilianization trend is largely the consequence of changes set in motion by World War II. Prior to 1945, military affairs were of little interest to civilian scholars and intellectuals. However, the advent of nuclear weapons to warfare and America’s status as the only nation capable of opposing the expansionist drive of the Soviet Union, both hallmarks of the post-World War II era, inspired unprecedented interest in national security affairs in the civilian academic community. “Social scientists, economists, natural scientists, and mathematicians all began to apply their special expertise to the relevant dimensions of national security.”<sup>14</sup>

Civilians moving into the area of strategy-making met little resistance from professional military men. Most senior officers in the postwar period were heirs of a tradition that discourages men in uniform from taking an active part in the politics of formulating national policy; they thus tended to shy away from strategy-making and to concentrate on the execution of policies handed down from civilian superiors.<sup>15</sup>

While academicians were beginning to monopolize the development of strategy—all the more so via the postwar proliferation of “think tanks” vying for government funds—systems analysts were winning important, if not dominant, roles in the DOD decision-making process. Systems analysis got its start in military affairs during World War II and steadily increased in importance, becoming a basic decision-

making tool during the McNamara years, when the number of systems analysts employed at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) level increased fifteenfold.<sup>16</sup>

In the decision-making process, systems analysis can be used as an alternative to experience, which makes it especially valuable in such realms as nuclear war and the development of radically new technologies where experience may be lacking. To be sure, systems analysis is useful also as a complementary tool of analysis in matters such as conventional warfare, where experience is available and is largely the possession of the heroic leader.

Certainly combat experience and systems analysis are not mutually exclusive factors in the decision-making process. Yet, as has been posited by retired Lt Gen Daniel Graham, USA—himself a veteran of the high-level decision-making process—systems analysis, combined with management training, has become a primary path to the top for officers. General Graham has remarked that the key to promotion for senior officers is the ability to “shepherd a weapons program through the Defense bureaucracy, get it into the budget, and defend it before the Bureau of Budget and the Congress. Such ability, he wrote, “involves considerable skill in applying cost-effectiveness and systems analysis techniques.”<sup>17</sup>

The overall impact of these two forms of civilianization—the replacement of military men with civilians and the displacement of military men from their traditional roles in strategy formulation and defense decision making—has been to undermine the authority and standing of the heroic leader. His judgment based upon combat experience is subject to challenge by systems analysts. His warrior ethos is eroded by constant interaction with civilians who permeate the defense establishment. The warrior ethos is being supplanted by the ethos of management.

### **Leadership and Management: Differences in Values**

Is leadership distinct from management? Members of the military profession have been arguing this issue, in one form or another, for years. The title of a 1975 article by Gen Lucius D. Clay tells us that “Management Is Not Command.”<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, a 1979 Air Force publication informs us that efforts to distinguish among management, leadership, and command are “usually a waste of time”: management is a generic term that also subsumes command and leadership.<sup>19</sup> Yet, the journal, *Military Review* considered the matter of leadership sufficiently important to devote its entire July 1980 edition to the subject, and in the lead article Gen Edward C. Meyer, then Army chief of staff, stated: “Leadership and management are neither synonymous nor interchangeable.”<sup>20</sup>

What is the basic issue here that could provoke such divergent views? Could it be that the military managers who run our armed forces have failed to maintain the vital martial image of the military and the crucial balance among military technologists, heroic leaders, and military managers? Could

it be that those who see themselves as heroic leaders are responding to a perceived overextension of the influence of management?

It seems clear that there has been a substantial increase in the emphasis on management in the armed forces since World War II. The McNamara years stand like a watershed in this respect. During the period from 1961 to 1969, military and business structures became almost identical, especially at the upper organizational levels. In the case of the Army, one book states that it “moved ever closer to the modern business corporation in concept, tone, language, and style.”<sup>21</sup>

The siren voices of management have resounded in the Air Force as well. The traditional inspection by the Inspector General has now become a “Management Evaluation Inspection.” Terms such as *battle management*, *battle manager*, *levels of management*, *resource management*, *weapons inventory*, *weapons systems*, and *management by objective* proliferate throughout the Air Force. Such management functions as budgeting and productivity improvement are pushed down to the lowest operational level—the traditional domain of the heroic leader—where they compete for the commander’s time and energy, often at the cost of essential and time-honored command functions.

Quite frequently, when these matters are discussed, those who would distinguish between management and leadership are told that the issue is merely one of semantics, that there is no substantive difference between the terms. What this conveys is that the various schools of management have co-opted into their language paradigm the terms traditionally used to describe command and leadership, making it linguistically impossible to distinguish between leadership and management. Thus, a good manager is defined as being also a good leader, and a good leader is required to be a good manager.

In fact, the linguistics difficulties may be the key to the underlying issue that fuels the debate. Words not only denote things and processes; they also carry connotations to which we all respond in one way or another. Furthermore, our words are indications of thought patterns that affect the way we perceive situations and the way we act in response to these situations. As psychologist Julian Janes has written: “Let no one think these are just word changes. Word changes are concept changes, and concept changes are behavioral changes.”<sup>22</sup>

Let us explore for one moment the different connotations of the two major words in the debate: lead and manage. To lead has clear connotations of influencing behavior by example, by being out front, by going before: to “lead the way, to go in advance of others . . . to be at the head of, command, direct.” It is the old idea of the officer who is out in front of his men, literally in the case of the bomb group commander leading his group in its first attack on the enemy’s home industrial base. In exercising leadership, the commander must at times compel his followers to undertake actions that may not be in their own best interest.

On the other hand, there are aspects of management that have clear connotations of manipulation, administration, and supervision. The manager convinces people that they should

do what the manager desires because it is in their best interest: the desired behavior may lead to rewards such as advancement, increased pay, higher status, and so forth.<sup>23</sup> The difference is validated by the mental images derived from these connotations: while one can easily visualize a person managing a large organization from some remote central point, it is more difficult to picture that person leading this group from a remote location, for leadership implies proximity and visibility to those being led.

Surely, then, some distinction is at work between the general concepts of management and leadership. The two are both value-laden and have the power to evoke different emotions, different spirits. As the words of the various management schools and concepts come to permeate the military milieu and replace the more traditional terms associated with leadership and command, the temper of the military profession changes. The heroic leader like Patton looks at a difficult situation fraught with unknowns, such as the invasion of North Africa, and says: “Wars are only won by risking the impossible.”<sup>24</sup> The military manager examines his Lanchestrian equations, determines that the odds are strongly against him, and does not take the risk.

Unfortunately, the transition in the outlook of the US military profession seems well advanced—a fact which substantially explains the increasing criticism heaped upon the profession. Steven Canby’s words are typical: “The study of war has all but atrophied in the United States. The best minds in the US military have become managerial and technical experts; but they have not studied their own professional discipline.”<sup>25</sup>

Another indication of this shift in the balance between military managers and heroic leaders is a significant trend in the military awards and decorations policy. When this writer was commissioned in 1962, medals for heroism dominated the medals worn by our nation’s military men. Six awards recognized battlefield heroism and combat service. There were only four decorations for meritorious service or achievement. While no new award has been added in recognition of combat feats, six new medals for outstanding achievements or service are now available to military personnel. There are now ten medals that one can earn for peacetime managerial-type accomplishments.

Unquestionably, our leaders were pursuing a worthy goal when they sought to provide more recognition for important peacetime achievements. Unfortunately, these new decorations have the unforeseen and undesirable effect of lowering the visibility and distinction of the heroic leader. If present trends continue, at some time in the future we may find that our most decorated military men never have seen combat.

## Technology and the Heroic Leader

A major factor in the ascent of the military manager has been the steady increase in the importance of technology in warfare. Generally, it is the military manager who keeps the military abreast of technological changes. He tends to be less

tradition-bound than the heroic leader and therefore more receptive to innovation.<sup>26</sup>

America is a technologically oriented society. We have a long tradition of substituting machines for people in our production efforts. Moreover, our nation is deeply imbued with Western humanism, which emphasizes the worth of the individual and the sanctity of human life. The increasing importance of technology in wars of the twentieth century, and the relatively low American casualty rates of World War I and World War II, could scarcely escape our notice.

In keeping with our national character, the general belief has taken root that machines should be substituted wherever possible for people on the battlefield, ensuring us of victory with minimum loss of human life. We tend to lose sight of the well-trained men of courage who must operate the machines in the hectic environment of battle.<sup>27</sup>

Although we still vaguely remember that generalship is the key to getting men and machines to the right place at the right time, we seem bent on replacing generals with computer programs and data banks. Thus, the real thrust of computerized command and control developments seems to be the complete mechanization of warfare. Men are to be reduced largely to drones that convey the instructions of one machine, the computer, to another set of drones operating other machines that fight the battles. Fighting men and their heroic leaders become largely superfluous in this approach to war.

The impact of this view of war obviously is to raise the stature of military technologists and military managers who are responsible for developing, procuring, and sustaining the wonder weapons of war. The importance of warriors and heroic leaders, as we have noted, is diminished.<sup>28</sup> “Operating a console in an air-conditioned electronic listening post becomes equivalent to facing a T72 tank with a hand-held missile.”<sup>29</sup>

There is a second and even more beguiling way in which modern technology has tended to undermine the heroic leader’s status in today’s military establishment. The advent of nuclear weapons has made it appear to many that war is outmoded and that military establishments exist only to deter war. As Bernard Brodie wrote some three decades ago: “Thus far, the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.”<sup>30</sup>

This “deterrence mentality” has led to a schism in the officer corps. A substantial number of officers, perhaps even a majority, believe that “peace is our profession”—that the military does exist only to deter war. This attitude contrasts sharply with the view of the heroic leader who continues to maintain that the military profession focuses on combat: in peace the soldier prepares for war, and in war he marches toward the sound of the guns.<sup>31</sup>

While deterrence mentality calls into question the heroic leader’s central place in our profession’s social structure, the importance of the technology upon which deterrence is based raises the status and authority of the military technologist and the military manager. Nuclear deterrence is directly related to

a given weapons complex, the so-called Triad of land-based, airborne and sea-based nuclear systems. Obviously, for those who see deterrence as the primary mission of the military, the scientists, technicians, and managers who ensure the continuing readiness of the deterrence force overshadow in importance the heroic leader who spends his time preparing his unit for what will be required should deterrence fail. When peace is your profession, those who would prepare for war appear outmoded and perhaps even dangerous.<sup>32</sup>

## Protecting an Endangered Species

As a consequence of the post-World War II developments that we have discussed, the balance among military managers, military technologists, and heroic leaders has been badly shaken. As these developments erode the status of the heroic leader and his warrior spirit, the function of the officer comes increasingly to be viewed in terms of management and technical activities.<sup>33</sup>

Sensing that it is losing its vocation which has traditionally centered on the heroic leader who is the master of the art and science of war, the military profession has sought to preserve its martial image by proclaiming the existence of the “fusion role model” predicted by Janowitz. As the Air Force personnel plan for 1975 put it: “The military professional is typically viewed in three roles—as a leader, manager, and technologist—in optimal balance, providing for the well-being of our nation’s defense posture.”<sup>34</sup>

But the fusion role model is not working. Its elements evoke behavioral patterns that are too disparate to be mastered effectively by the vast majority of officers. It is not the fusion role model but the realities of military service in the 1980s that are shaping the attitudes and actions of today’s generation of young officers.

Only about 15 percent of all members of the Department of Defense are engaged in uniquely military functions today.<sup>35</sup> What advantage is there in belonging to such a minority when there are clear indications that success comes to the technical specialist and the manager who can effectively handle top-level staff responsibilities?<sup>36</sup> Already within the Air Force there are indications that support functions have more prestige among junior officers than line functions.<sup>37</sup> And a “senior Pentagon aide” has proclaimed publicly: “The era is over of flamboyant combat heroes rising to the top of the military. The military is no longer going to win the budget game through image and authority. The brass are going to win it by knowing their stuff and knowing how to present it.”<sup>38</sup> It appears that the heroic leader is becoming an endangered species.

Given that the balance among military managers, military technologists and heroic leaders is vital to an effective military establishment, and recognizing that the balance has been undermined by post-World War II developments in the US military profession, what actions might we consider to correct current trends?

## **Recruiting Pressures of the All-Volunteer Force**

The nation seems unlikely to return to a draft in the near future. Therefore, we must find ways to reduce recruiting pressures that undermine our ability to focus on war-fighting attitudes and skills. Could these pressures be eliminated by establishing a civilian organization similar to the Selective Service System and charging it with the responsibility for recruiting? Such an organization would return local involvement to the process of procuring defense personnel and would take the armed services out of an activity marked by scandals and litigation that have tarnished the military's image in the post-Vietnam era, a delicate time in American civil-military relations.

## **Socialization of the Officer Corps**

Can we do more to socialize the young men and women whom we bring into the officer corps? Are the curricula of our service academies appropriate, or have they become so inclusive of various academic disciplines that they have lost their focus on the profession of arms? Are cadets and midshipmen now more concerned with majoring in a marketable academic discipline than with preparing themselves for a lifetime of service in the profession of arms?<sup>39</sup> Is Officer Training School long enough and does it include enough indoctrination into the customs, courtesies, and traditions of the military profession? Do we demand enough of our ROTC training programs? Are senior officers devoting enough of their energies to "bringing along" the next generation of officers?

## **Language of the Profession**

Should we not be more careful about the way in which we talk and think about the military profession? Why should we abandon perfectly good traditional terms like Inspector General Inspection just because replacement terms sound more modern and up-to-date? The use of military phrases and words like Gen Bennie L. Davis's "officership"<sup>40</sup> could end the military's dependence on management terminology to describe the officer's duties and activities.

At least one effect of the wide use of management language has been a breakdown of the distinction between the military profession and civilian occupations. Using traditional military terms in describing military functions should help restore a sense of the military as a unique and special profession. Tradition can be overdone, but properly used it provides continuity with a rich past and a guide in an uncertain future.

## **The Prestige of Combat Decorations**

Can we find some way to restore the prestige of combat decorations? Would it be possible to withdraw the more recently established defense awards for meritorious service and achievement and replace them with decorations like the

Distinguished Service Medal and the Legion of Merit? Could we separate the combat-related decorations and their peacetime counterparts on uniforms, for example, over the left and right breastpocket, respectively? Failing this, could we perhaps increase the precedence of awards for combat service so that the top four awards for valor (Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star, and Distinguished Flying Cross) would outrank all noncombat awards except perhaps the Distinguished Service Medal?

## **A New Approach to Civilianization**

In an effort to restore and nurture a sense of uniqueness and service in uniformed members of the defense establishment, can we find some organizational pattern that separates DOD civilians and the military? One scheme that might be considered is a gradual civilianization of organizations that contain fewer military personnel than civilians. Conversely, in those organizations where the uniformed service members are in the majority, civilians would be replaced gradually by military personnel as the former retire and transfer. This process would have the effect of making civilian supervisors responsible for function accomplishment through a civilian work force and leave officers and NCOs with responsibility for purely military units. It would reduce friction between the military way and the civilian way, each of which is valid and appropriate within its own context.<sup>41</sup>

## **Revival of the Line and Staff Categories**

Can we find a way to revitalize the traditional distinction between line and staff officers? Perhaps we could include in the line-officer category all aircrew members and those who serve in the combat branches and are likely to be involved in combat or close combat support. Staff officers would be the remaining officers, with the exception of chaplains, veterinarians, physicians, dentists, and legal personnel, who would comprise a special third category.

Once the line and staff distinction is redrawn, various measures would be used to make service in the line more attractive and prestigious. Among the measures that might be considered are providing distinctive accoutrements for uniforms, granting special survivor benefits for line officers who die in the line of duty, and awarding one and one-half years promotion list service time for each year in a line position after the first five years of line service. Furthermore, only those who had served the first 20 years of commissioned service in the line would be eligible for 20-year retirement. Finally, a selection process might be devised that would limit the number of staff officers permitted to transfer into line service. The idea of all of this is to make the line something of an elite corps; it would be difficult to enter and easy to leave.<sup>42</sup>

There are hopeful signs on the horizon. Here are two such signs: For some time now, efforts have been underway to reform the curricula of the professional military education schools at Maxwell Air Force Base. More emphasis is being

placed on the art and science of war, especially at the Air War College. This effort is making headway and is receiving considerable support from the top Air Force leadership. In the US Army, there continues to be a spirited dialogue over the importance of heroic leaders and the things the Army should do to nurture them.

But the hour is late, and Mars is a cruel and impatient master. If we are to have the military establishment that we need to cope with an ever more treacherous global environment, we must rediscover the focus of the military profession and restore the heroic leader to the position of honor we have traditionally accorded him.

## Notes

1. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1971), 21, 35, 164.
2. Ibid., 21. A similar picture of the American military profession in the nineteenth century is presented in Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (New York: Random House, 1957). See specifically 193, 195, 200–203, 211–21, 226–37, 255–56.
3. Janowitz, op. cit., 72, 161, 426.
4. Ibid., 32.
5. Ibid., 21, 33–36, 168, 224–25.
6. Morely Safer, CBS Evening News, 20 March 1981.
7. J. L. Reed, *The Beard Study. An Analysis and Evaluation of the United States Army* in US Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, *Status of the All-Volunteer Armed Force, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel of the Senate Committee on Armed Services*, 95th Cong., 2d sess., 1978, 135–36. For a view of the contractual nature of the new Air Force recruit's relations with the military, see Anthony Lynn Batezel, "Getting What Your Recruiter Promised," *Air Force Magazine*, June 1978, 76–78.
8. James Fallows, "The Civilianization of the Army," *The Atlantic Monthly*, April 1981, 98. For information on other changes in the Army, see William L. Hauser, *America's Army in Crisis: A Study in Civil-Military Relations* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 133–39.
9. Information on these concepts can be found in "Co-worker Standards: Some New Findings—LMDC," *TIG Brief* 4, 1981, 4; Ed Gates, "USAF's Growing Grievance System," *Air Force Magazine*, January 1979, 50–59; Denis D. Umstot and William E. Rosenbach, "From Theory to Action: Implementing Job Enrichment in the Air Force," *Air University Review*, March–April 1980, 75; and Laurie A. Broeding, "Industrial Democracy and the Future Management of the United States Armed Forces," *Air University Review*, September–October 1977, 42–52.
10. Gates, op. cit., 59; Zeb B. Bradford and Frederic J. Brown, "Implications of the Modern Battlefield," *Military Review*, July 1977, 8; and Fielding Arty (nom de plume), "It's Just Not Fun Anymore," *Army*, April 1981, 13, 16.
11. The Marines are our most combat-oriented service, yet Bill Lind tells us in his recent book on maneuver warfare that Marine battalions at Camp Pendleton spend only about 30 days a year in the field. William S. Lind, *Maneuver Warfare Handbook* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), 46.
12. For two pieces that illustrate this contrast in attitude, see Arty, op. cit., and Gerald Raubach, "Engineers' Exodus," *Air Force Magazine*, July 1978, 9.
13. Lawrence J. Korb, "Civilians in Defense the Resource and the Challenge," *Defense Management Journal*, Third Quarter, 1983, 5.
14. Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy, The Wars of the United States*, ed. Louis Morton (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1973), 405–6.
15. David MacIsaac, "Military Education in the United States," work in progress. See also Bernard Brodie, "The Development of Nuclear Strategy," *International Security*, Spring 1978, 67, where we read: "Virtually all the basic ideas and philosophies about nuclear weapons and their use have been generated by civilians working quite independently of the military."
16. Ralph Sanders, *The Politics of Defense Analysis* (New York: Dunellen Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), 7–8.
17. Daniel Graham, "The Decline of US Strategic Thought," *Air Force Magazine*, August 1977, 27–28; For a similar view, see James Fallows, "America's High-Tech Weaponry," *The Atlantic Monthly*, May 1981, 31. For a discussion of the conflict between experience and systems analysis, see Sanders, op. cit., 15, 157–59.
18. "Management Is Not Command," *Air Force Magazine*, September 1975, 63.
19. US Air Force Air War College, *Managing the Air Force: A Reference Text for Department of Executive Management Studies*, 1979–1980 edition, viii. It is interesting to note that this line of thinking has been softened somewhat in the 1980–1981 (second) edition, which notes that leadership is so important to the Air Force that it is treated in a separate book, *Officership*. See page ix of the second edition. In a welcome step Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 35-49, *Air Force Leadership*, 1 September 1985, clearly distinguishes between leadership and management.
20. "Leadership: A Return to Basics," *Military Review*, July 1980, 6.
21. Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, *Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978), 19–22.
22. *The Origins of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bi-Cameral Mind* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1976), 292.
23. Janowitz, op. cit., 8, comments on the rise of persuasive management as opposed to traditional, authoritarian leadership.
24. Martin Blumenson, *The Patton Papers: 1940–1945*, vol. II, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1974), 84.
25. "General Purpose Forces," *International Security Review*, Fall 1980, 319. For similar views, see Jeffrey Record, "Is Our Military Incompetent?" *Newsweek*, 22 December 1980, 9; and Edward N. Luttwak, "The Decline of American Military Leadership," *Parameters* X, no. 4, 82–88. See also Richard A. Gabriel, *Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn't Win* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985).
26. Janowitz, op. cit., chapter 2. See especially 22.
27. S. L. A. Marshall, *Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War* (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1947), 23. Here Marshall noted that already in 1947 Americans were forgetting the importance of the men who operated the weapons of World War II. For a fuller development of the argument being presented here, see Donald R. Baucom, "Technological War: Reality and the American Myth" in *Air University Review*, September/October 1981, 56–66.
28. This is the thrust of the comments of General Graham which I presented above. To this point also are the observations of James Fallows, op. cit., 31, that the services are becoming procurement oriented: the path to the key positions of authority in the military is through procurement management. That support functions are beginning to have higher prestige than line functions in the Air Force is indicated by Frank R. Wood, "Air Force Junior Officers: Changing Prestige and Civilianization," *Armed Forces and Society* VI, no. 3 (Spring 1980): 483–506.
29. Lee Olson, "Air Force Goal: Motivate People," *Denver Post*, 1 July 1977, 20, quotes an Air Force general as stating that his technicians are "on the front line and they fight back as hard as they can."
30. Bernard Brodie, "Implications for Military Policy," in *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order*, ed. Bernard Brodie (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1946), 76.
31. Here I ascribe to Janowitz's heroic leader an attitude Huntington assigns to the line officer. See Huntington, op. cit., 254–56.
32. Fred Reed, "Military Minds," *Signal*, January 1980, 69. Reed criticized what he referred to as the military mind, considering Patton and LeMay as examples of this mythological mind-set. He said: "The Pattons and LeMays are occasionally useful, always dangerous, and a good case for civilian control of the military." Edward N. Luttwak, *The Pentagon and the Art of War: The Question of Military Reform* (New York: Simon and

Schuster, 1984), 198, tells us that officers with a strong interest in military arts are considered eccentric.

33. Reed, *op. cit.*, remarks: “Especially in the Air Force and Navy, officers tend to be engineers.” Information of master’s degrees in the Air Force as of March 1980 reveals that Air Force officers are far more likely to be managers than engineers. At the time, the Air Force was showing 12,492 master’s degrees in administrative management and military science and only 3,410 master’s degrees in engineering. For a discussion of officer as military manager, see “The Price of Power,” *Time*, 29 October 1979, 29. See also Morton Kondracke, “Defense without Mirrors,” *The New Republic*, 24 January 1981, 12.

34. USAF Personnel Plan, 5 September 1975, vol. 1, 1-1.

35. Charles C. Moskos Jr., “The All-Volunteer Force,” *Wilson Quarterly*, Spring 1979, 137.

36. Luttwak, “Decline of American Military Leadership,” *op. cit.*, 85–86.

37. See note 28.

38. “Price of Power,” *op. cit.*, 29.

39. For some comments on change at US service academies, see Cathy Downes, “Educating for the Profession of the Arms: USMA West Point and RMA Sandhurst,” *RUSI Journal*, 4 December 1981, 33–39, and John P. Lovell, *Neither Athens Nor Sparta? The American Service Academies in Transition* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979).

40. “Officership: A Profound Commitment,” *Supplement to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders*, January 1981, 24–29.

41. For similar suggestions pertaining to the Army, see Hauser, *op. cit.*, chapter 12.

42. *Ibid.*